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Is ISO 14001 a Gateway to More Advanced Voluntary Action? 
A Case for Green Supply Chain Management  
Toshi H. Arimura, Nicole Darnall, and Hajime Katayama 
Abstract 
Using Japanese facility-level data, we estimate the effects of ISO 14001 certification on the 
promotion of more advanced practices, namely green supply chain management (GSCM). Our results 
show that ISO 14001 promotes GSCM practices, in that facilities with environmental management 
systems (EMS) certified to ISO 14001 are 40 percent more likely to assess their suppliers’ environmental 
performance and 50 percent more likely to require that their suppliers undertake specific environmental 
practices. Further, we find that government approaches that encourage voluntary EMS adoption indirectly 
promote GSCM practices, in that the probability of facilities’ assessing their suppliers’ environmental 
performance and requiring them to undertake specific environmental practices increases by 9 percent and 
10 percent, respectively, if a government assistance program exists. Combined, these findings suggest that 
there may be significant but previously unnoticed spillover effects of ISO 14001 and government 
promotion of voluntary action. 
Key Words:  voluntary actions, positive spillover, environmental management systems, ISO 
14001, green supply chain management, government assistance programs, 
environmental impacts, discrete choice model, endogeneity 
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A Case for Green Supply Chain Management  
Toshi H. Arimura, Nicole Darnall, and Hajime Katayama ∗ 
1. Introduction 
An increasing number of governments have started to promote voluntary actions by 
private corporations to achieve their environmental goals. The popularity of this approach stems 
from the fact that voluntary actions are more acceptable to the private sector than prescriptive 
mandates or economic instruments like pollution taxes and emissions trading. Moreover, 
government-encouraged voluntary approaches are less costly than traditional command-and-
control systems, which impose a significant administrative burden on regulators for monitoring 
and enforcement. 
Partly because of governments’ promotion, voluntary actions are becoming more 
common among industrial facilities. One of the more widely used voluntary actions involves an 
environmental management system (EMS). Industrial facilities that adopt EMS systematically 
develop an environmental policy, evaluate their internal processes that affect the environment, 
create objectives and targets, monitor progress, and undergo management review. In particular, 
ISO 14001, the EMS standard designed by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), has received growing attention. By 2005, more than 88,800 facilities worldwide had been 
certified to the standard (Peglau [23]). 
Because of the popularity of ISO 14001, researchers have begun to examine the factors 
that motivate facilities to adopt ISO 14001 and its effect on their environmental performance. 
These studies have found that the adoption of ISO 14001 is influenced by firm size, export ratio, 
debt ratio, stakeholders’ environmental preferences and pressures, and firms’ financial flexibility 
(Nakamura et al. [21], Nishitani [22] ). They also have found that greater regulatory pressure 
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leads to early uptake of ISO 14001 (King et al. [17], Potoski and Prakash [24],[25], Darnall and 
Edwards [7]).  
In terms of the effectiveness of ISO 14001 adoption, the research findings are equivocal. 
On the one hand, some studies show that ISO 14001 certification can reduce an industrial 
facility’s environmental impacts (Arimura et al. [2], Potoski and Prakash [24], Melnyk et al. 
[19]) and improve its compliance with environmental regulations (Potoski and Prakash [25]). On 
the other hand, some studies find little evidence that ISO 14001 improves facilities’ 
environmental performance (Barla [3], King et al. [17], Darnall and Sides [9]).1  
A commonality among previous studies that assess the effectiveness of ISO 14001 is that  
they measure environmental performance only for the facility that adopts the EMS standard. 
However, it is possible that even though an adopter of ISO 14001 may not directly improve its 
environmental performance, it may implement policies and practices that affect the 
environmental actions of other organizations. For example, ISO 14001-certified facilities may be 
more likely to implement green supply chain management (GSCM) practices and thus assess 
suppliers’ environmental performance when making their purchasing decisions. It is also 
possible that certified facilities may be more likely to attempt to green their supply chain by 
requiring that their suppliers undertake particular environmental measures. These potential 
spillover effects of ISO 14001 have been largely overlooked in the literature. Additionally, 
although previous studies (Arimura et al. [2]) show that government-promoted voluntary 
approaches can help reduce facilities’ environmental impacts, they have not considered how ISO 
14001 and other programs may indirectly encourage GSCM. 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the relationship between facilities’ 
ISO 14001 certification and GSCM practices. In particular, using Japanese facility-level data 
from a survey conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), we estimate the effects of ISO 14001 certification on the promotion of GSCM 
practices. Further, we assess the extent to which government-sponsored assistance programs that 
encourage facilities to adopt ISO 14001 also influence them to adopt GSCM practices.  
We find the effects of ISO 14001 on GSCM practices to be quite large. Facilities with 
ISO 14001 are about 40 percent are more likely to assess their suppliers’ environmental 
performance than facilities without ISO 14001 and 50 percent more likely to require that their 
suppliers undertake specific environmental practices. We also show that policies that encourage 
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facilities to adopt EMS are indirectly related to the implementation of GSCM practices. 
Specifically, the availability of government-sponsored programs that encourage facilities to use 
EMS make it 9 percent more likely that facilities will also assess their suppliers’ environmental 
performance and make it 10 percent more likely that facilities will also require their suppliers to 
undertake specific environmental practices.  
The fact that ISO 14001 promotes GSCM practices suggests the possibility of ISO 
14001’s positive externality: If a firm assesses its suppliers’ environmental performance and 
requires them to undertake environmental measures, suppliers may subsequently improve their 
environmental performance. If so, ISO 14001-certified facilities play a role in reducing 
environmental impacts outside their production process. Additionally, a government policies that 
promote voluntary EMS adoption may encourage broader environmental improvements within 
private firms. Our results therefore suggest that the effectiveness of ISO 14001 and the benefit 
from government-promoted voluntary actions may be far greater than previously considered.  
2. ISO 14001 and Green Supply Chain Management 
2.1 ISO 14001 
Environmental management systems generally consist of internal policies, assessments, 
plans, and implementation actions (Coglianese and Nash [5] 2001) that affect facilities and their 
effects on the natural environment. ISO 14001 is an internationally recognized EMS standard 
that was developed by the International Organization for Standardization, a nongovernmental 
organization. What differentiates ISO 14001 environmental management from noncertified 
systems is that ISO 14001 requires external third-party verification to ensure that facilities 
conform to the ISO standard.2 A certified facility must first commit to reducing its environmental 
impacts over time. Then it must demonstrate that its EMS meets ISO’s five basic components: 
conformance to the facility’s environmental policy, environmental planning (referred to in brief 
as “Plan”), plan implementation and operation (“Do”), periodic monitoring (“Check”), corrective 
action (“Act”), and management review, which generally occurs on an annual basis). Once 
certified, a facility must follow this cycle of Plan–Do–Check–Act over time to maintain its 
registration (Arimura et al. [2]).  
                                                 
2 ISO 14000 series consists of 23 standards constituting the ISO 14000 “family.” One such standard is ISO 14001. 
This standard requires certification, whereas the others do not. In some instances an organization may claim its EMS 
conforms to ISO 14001, but does not obtain certification. The focus of this paper is on actual certification.   4
By virtue of undergoing certification, ISO 14001-registered facilities are more likely to 
formalize their commitment to achieving environmental performance goals (Rondinelli and 
Vastag [27]). Additionally, these facilities are more likely to embed environmental practices 
deep within their operational frameworks so that protecting the natural environment becomes an 
integral element of their operational strategies. For these reasons, ISO 14001 is hypothesized to 
help facilities reduce their environmental impacts, and this hypothesis has been tested by many 
studies, as mentioned earlier. 
In contrast, the link between ISO 14001 and GSCM practices has drawn little attention. 
One reason is that the ISO 14001 standard does not require firms to assess the environmental 
impacts of their supply chain decisions. However, as explained below, firms that have certified 
ISO 14001 may be able to implement GSCM at a lower cost. This suggests that certified firms 
may be more likely to implement GSCM practices, thereby engaging suppliers to reduce their 
own environmental impacts. If so, the environmental benefits of ISO 14001 may be far greater 
than considered previously. 
2.2 Green Supply Chain Management 
To understand the relationship between ISO 14001 and GSCM, it is important first to 
define a firm’s supply chain and its relationship with the natural environment. The supply chain 
consists of all parties that are involved in fulfilling a customer request, including the suppliers, 
transporters, warehouses, retailers, and customers themselves (Cox [6]). A facility’s supply chain 
impacts on the environment stem from inputs that increase waste during product storage, 
transportation, processing, use, or disposal. These inputs affect a final producer’s products, 
production waste, and disposal (Handfield et al. [13]). Facilities that purchase inputs from a 
specific supplier also acquire waste from each supplier up the supply chain (Darnall et al. [8]). 
One purpose of GSCM, therefore, is to avoid inheriting environmental risks from less 
environmentally conscious suppliers (Klassen and Whybark [18]). In so doing, facilities assess 
the environmental performance of their suppliers and require suppliers to undertake measures 
that ensure the environmental quality of their products (Handfield et al. [14]). 
Most facilities implement environmental practices that address their direct environmental 
impacts. GSCM, in contrast, seeks to affect the environmental behavior of other firms. Because 
they seek to manage their more environmental impacts throughout their networks, facilities that 
adopt GSCM practices have a more far-reaching environmental strategy.  
2.3 Impacts of ISO 14001 on GSCM 
GSCM has potentially significant implications for an organization’s environmental 
performance because GSCM, together with ISO 14001, offers a more comprehensive means of   5
achieving environmental goals among networks of firms. To the extent that ISO 14001-certified 
organizations are more likely to green their supply chain, the social benefits of ISO 14001 can be 
significant if these networks work together to reduce their environmental impacts.  
Our view is that ISO 14001 potentially promotes GSCM. At their core, both ISO 14001 
and GSCM rely on a continuous improvement model. ISO 14001 requires organizations to 
continually reduce their impact to the natural environment. Similarly, GSCM practices leverage 
continual improvement processes to reduce the impact of supplier inputs on the organization’s 
final product (Preuss [26]). The continual improvement capabilities necessary to maintain ISO 
14001 certification also are helpful for GSCM because both practices require facilities to 
systematically assess about their impacts to the natural environment (Darnall et al. [8]). 
Moreover, like ISO 14001, GSCM practices require organizations to have strong inventory 
control systems that reduce redundant stock materials and unnecessary inputs in the production 
process (Rosenberg and Campbell [28]). 
ISO 14001 adopters have knowledge and proficiencies in pollution prevention practices 
(Darnall and Edwards [7]). They also have invested in training their employees to seek out 
pollution prevention opportunities. By encouraging their employees to work together in teams, 
ISO 14001 adopters may be able to leverage their pollution prevention skills and environmental 
knowledge toward other integrated forms of environmental management, such as GSCM 
practices. ISO 14001 therefore offers a framework to more readily support GSCM decisions. 
In short, because the skills and management practices required to certify to ISO 14001 
are similar to those for GSCM, we expect ISO 14001 to reduce the costs of GSCM. 
Consequently, we anticipate that facilities with ISO 14001 are more likely to adopt GSCM 
practices.  
3. Econometric Model 
Our econometric framework is essentially a treatment effects model. A facility’s GSCM 
practices depend on whether it receives a “treatment”—in our context, whether it adopts ISO 
14001. The problem we encounter is that unobserved facility-specific factors, such as managers’ 
attitudes toward the environment, are likely to be correlated with both GSCM practices and the 
adoption of ISO 14001. Because of this correlation, the facility’s choice of adoption is 
potentially an endogenous variable. 
Let 
*
i ASSESS  and 
*
i REQUIRE  be facility i’s net benefits from assessing the 
environmental performance of its suppliers and from requiring its suppliers to undertake 
environmental measures, respectively. They are assumed to depend on the adoption of ISO 
14001 as well as a set of control variables. Specifically, we assume that   6
*
1          , iA iA ii A ASSESS ISO X θ ε ′ =+ + δ (1) 
*
1          , iR iR ii R REQUIRE ISO X θ ε ′ =+ + δ (2) 
where  i ISO  is an indicator variable for the adoption of ISO 14001,  1i X  is a vector of 
control variables, and  ij ε (, ) j AR =  is an idiosyncratic error. Since both net benefits are likely to 
depend on similar unobserved factors,  iA ε  and  iR ε  are expected to be correlated with each other. 
Hereafter, we call equations (1) and (2) the “assess equation” and the “require equation,” 
respectively. 
*
i ASSESS  and 
*
i REQUIRE  are not observed. What we actually observe is whether the 
facility assesses its suppliers in terms of their environmental performance ( i ASSESS ) and 
whether it requires its suppliers to undertake environmental measures ( i REQUIRE ). We assume 
that  i ASSESS  equals one if 
* 0 i ASSESS ≥  and zero otherwise. That is, the facility assesses its 
suppliers if the net benefit from doing so is greater than or equal to zero. REQUIRE  and 
*
i REQUIRE  are related in an analogous fashion.  
If  i ISO  is an exogenous variable (i.e., it is independent of  iA ε  and  iR ε ) and (,) iA iR ε ε  are 
normally distributed with zero mean, the model would become a bivariate probit model with 
certain normalization. However, unobserved facility-specific factors are captured by  iA ε  and  iR ε  
while concurrently affecting the adoption of ISO 14001. Because of this correlation, the facility’s 
choice of ISO 14001 adoption is potentially endogenous, and hence estimation of the bivariate 
probit model may lead to inconsistent estimates of the ISO 14001 effects. For consistent 
estimates, we therefore treat  i ISO  as an endogenous dummy variable. This leads us to have an 
additional binary choice equation (hereafter called the “ISO equation”). Let  *
i ISO  be the net 
benefit from adopting ISO 14001.  *
i ISO  is determined by 
*      , iI S O ii I S O ISO X ε ′ =+ δ (3) 
where  i X  is a set of exogenous variables and  iISO ε  is an idiosyncratic error. We assume 
that the facility will adopt ISO 14001 if its net benefit is greater than or equal to zero; i ISO  equals 
one if  * 0 i ISO ≥ and zero otherwise. 
The estimation model consists of the three equations, (1)–(3). We assume that 
(,, ) ii A i R i I S O ε εε ′ = ε  is normally distributed with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ, thereby 
allowing all the error terms to be correlated arbitrarily. Since parameters in this model are not 
identified without normalization, we set all diagonal terms of Σ equal to 1s; with this   7
normalization, the model results in a standard multivariate probit model.3 As identification is 
achieved only through the parametric assumption, we impose the following exclusion 
restrictions: one variable (i.e., an instrumental variable) in  i X  is excluded from  1i X . The choice 
of the instrument is explained in the next section. 
4. Data Description 
4.1 Survey Data  
To evaluate our relationships of interest, we relied on data collected from a 12-page 
survey developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 
Environment Directorate and academic researchers from Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Japan, Norway, and the United States. The authors of this study were involved in the 
development of the survey and in data collection. The objective of the survey was to collect 
information on environmental practices and performances from manufacturing facilities within 
these countries. To collect the Japanese data, researchers cooperated with the Japanese Ministry 
of the Environment. Japanese surveys were sent to individuals who worked in Japanese 
manufacturing facilities having at least 50 employees and who were responsible for the facility’s 
environmental activities. Two follow-up mailings were sent to prompt additional responses. A 
total of 4,757 facility managers were randomly chosen from all Japanese manufacturing 
facilities. Despite the survey’s length, the response rate was 32 percent (1,499 respondents), 
which exceeds that of previous assessments of organizations’ voluntary environmental practices: 
Christmann [4] achieved a response rate of 20.1 percent; Delmas and Keller [10], 11.2 percent; 
and Melnyk et al. [19], 10.35 percent.  
To reduce reporting bias, survey respondents were guaranteed anonymity. Additionally, 
the OECD examined nonresponse bias by evaluating the general distribution of its survey 
respondents. It assessed the industry representation and facility size of the survey sample relative 
to the distribution of facilities in the broader population and found no statistically significant 
                                                 
3 Calculation of the likelihood function involves evaluating three-dimensional integrals over the latent errors  i ε  for 
which no closed-form solution exists. To overcome this computational difficulty, we use the maximum simulated 
likelihood along with the GHK simulator (Geweke [12], Hajivassiliou [13], Keane [16]), a standard approach for 
estimation of multivariate probit models. The number of drawings for the simulator is set to be 100.  
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differences (Johnstone et al. [15]). These results were further confirmed in Arimura et al. [2].4 
After removing incomplete responses from the 1,499 replies, our final sample contained either 
811 or 945 facilities, depending upon model specifications. The summary statistics of variables 
used for estimation are presented in Table 1.  
4.2 ISO Certification and Measures of GSCM 
Examining the extent to which facilities are undertaking GSCM practices is complicated 
by a lack of secondary data, since measures of GSCM practices generally cannot be obtained 
without asking facilities directly. We overcame this problem by asking two questions about 
GSCM practices: “Does your facility regularly assess the environmental performance of its 
suppliers?” and “Does your facility require its suppliers to undertake environmental measures?” 
From the responses, we construct ASSESS and REQUIRE, respectively. As Table 1 shows, 40.7 
percent of the facilities assess their suppliers, and 39.2 percent require their suppliers to 
undertake environmental measures.  
Table 2 shows stark differences in ASSESS and REQUIRE across ISO 14001 adopters. 
Specifically, facilities with ISO 14001 are 22.5 percent more likely to assess the environmental 
performance of their suppliers and 46.9 percent more likely to require that their suppliers 
undertake environmental measures. These differences are suggestive of the effects of ISO 14001, 
though one should not interpret them as causal.  
4.3 Exogenous Variables and Instrument 
A set of exogenous variables is constructed from the information in the survey. They 
include basic facility and firm characteristics—namely, the number of employees in the facility 
in logarithm (LNFACEMPL), age of the facility in logarithm (LNFACEMPL), the number of 
facilities in the firm (FRMFACS), and whether the firm to which the facility belongs is publicly 
traded (FRMQUOT). We also include a variable indicating whether the facility has a foreign 
head office (FRMINTL).  
The implementation of quality control is known to affect the adoption of ISO 14001 
(Nakamura et al, [21], Arimura et al.[2]) because both quality control and ISO 14001 involve 
similar continual improvement processes. We thus include a dummy variable, OMPQMS, which 
takes the value of one if the facility implemented quality control.  
                                                 
4 It is possible, however, that there are some important unobservable differences between respondents and non-
respondents. This may be a potential caveat to the interpretation of our results. The associated issues are discussed in 
Arimura et al [2].   9
To capture market concentration, we construct MRKTCONC, which equals one if the 
number of competitors for the facility’s most commercially important product is fewer than five. 
We also control for market scope by using three dummy variables. MRKTSCOP1, MRKTSCOP2, 
and MRKTSCOP3 take the value of one if the scope of the facility’s market is national, regional 
(neighboring countries), and global, respectively. Here, the reference case is the local market. 
Furthermore, types of prime customers are controlled for, since they may influence the adoption 
of ISO 14001 (e.g., Arimura et al. [2]). We use two dummy variables, CUSTEND and 
CUSTMIDDLE, that take the value of one if the primary customers are households or 
wholesalers and other manufacturing firms, respectively. 
Stakeholders may influence both ISO 14001 and GSCM as well. Influences from various 
stakeholders were measured by responses to this survey question: “How important do you 
consider the influence of the following groups or organizations on the environmental practices of 
your facility?” Respondents ranked the importance of stakeholders by indicating “not important,” 
“moderately important,” or “very important.” We construct a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the response was “important” or “very important.” The stakeholders were listed as 
corporate headquarters (INFLCORP), household consumers (INFLCONS), shareholders 
(INFLINV), banks (INFLBANK), management employees (INFLMGMT), nonmanagement 
employees (INFLWORK), labor unions (INFLUNIO), industry associations (INFLIND), 
environmental groups (INFLENGO), and community groups (INFLCOMM).  
Since environmental policy can be determining factors for both ISO 14001 and GSCM 
practices, we control for various types of policy instruments. Specifically, we include 10 dummy 
variables, each of which takes the value of one if facilities are subject to the following policy 
instruments: input bans (INPTBAN), technical standards (TECHSTD), performance standards 
(PERSTD), input taxes (INPTAX), liability for environmental damages (LIAB), demand 
information measures (INFODMD), supply information measures (INFOSPPL), voluntary 
agreements (VOLAGR), subsidies (SUBSIDY), and technical assistance (TECHASS). 
To capture the heterogeneity of environmental managers, the survey asked facility 
managers to rank the importance of preventing environmental incidents as part of the facility’s 
environmental practices: “not important”, “important,” or ”very important.” We construct 
dummy variables, AMTPREV2 and AMTPREV3, that take the value of one for the responses 
“important” and “very important,” respectively. Similarly, based on the survey, we construct 
dummy variables for four other types of motivations: regulatory compliance (AMTRGC2, 
AMTRGC3), corporate profile or image (AMTIMG2, AMTIMG3), cost savings (AMTSAV2, 
AMTSAV3), and new technology development or product development (AMTTECH2, 
AMTTECH3).   10
As an instrument variable, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
facility is encouraged to adopt an EMS through assistance programs (PRGEMP); that is, 
PRGEMP is included in X (in equation 3) but not X1 (in equations 1 or 2). The choice of this 
instrument is based on the characteristics of those programs. Some local government assistance 
programs provide technical and/or financial support for ISO 14001 adoption, and those programs 
are found to be effective in promoting it (e.g., Arimura et al. [2]). However, the programs do not 
require facilities to undertake GSCM practices. It is therefore plausible to assume that PRGEMP 
does not directly affect GSCM practices. 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Correlations between Errors 
The estimation results show that the error terms in the assess equation and in the require 
equation are positively and significantly correlated; the estimated correlation is 0.555 with the 
standard error of 0.058. These findings suggest that similar unobservables affect both ASSESS 
and REQUIRE. 
The results also indicate the endogeneity of ISO 14001 in the assess equation. The 
correlation between the error terms in the ISO equation and in the assess equation is estimated to 
be –0.538 with the standard error of 0.204. The negative correlation is in line with findings in 
previous studies. For example, Arimura et al. [2] find that ISO 14001 is endogenous in the 
environmental performance equation. They find a negative correlation between the error terms in 
the ISO 14001 adoption equation and those in environmental performance.  
By contrast, ISO 14001 is found to be exogenous in the require equation; the error term 
in the ISO equation is not significantly correlated with that in the require equation. These 
findings suggest that a univariate model indeed suffices for consistent estimates of the require 
equation. After presenting the results of the multivariate model, we will compare them with the 
results of the univariate model.  
5.2. ISO Equation 
Estimated coefficients of the ISO equation and the corresponding average partial effects 
are presented in Table 3 (Columns (5) and (6), respectively). We summarize these results only 
briefly here because our focus is on the assess and require equations. 
We find that facilities that are large (LNFACEMPL), have a quality management system 
in place (OMPQMS), or export to foreign countries (MRKTSCOP3) are more likely to adopt ISO 
14001. These results are consistent with those in previous studies (e.g., Nakamura et al. [21], 
Welch et al. [29], Arimura et al. [2]). We also find that facility managers for whom corporate   11
profile or image is an important motivation for environmental practices (AMTIMG3) are more 
likely to adopt ISO 14001.  
5.3. Assess and Require Equations 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 present estimated coefficients of the assess equation and 
the require equation. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 show the corresponding average partial 
effects, respectively. The coefficients on ISO in both equations are positive and highly 
significant, indicating that the adoption of ISO 14001 increases both the probability of assessing 
suppliers’ environmental performance and the probability of requiring suppliers to undertake 
environmental measures. The effects seem to be large; the average partial effects are estimated to 
be 40.7 percent for ASSESS and 49.2 percent for REQUIRE.  
Our findings suggest the possibility of ISO 14001’s positive externality in that a facility’s 
adoption of ISO 14001 may positively affect the environmental performance of its suppliers. 
This is because the adoption of ISO 14001 has positive effects on the implementation of GSCM 
practices, which in turn may make it likely that suppliers reduce their environmental impacts.5 
It should be stressed that all previous empirical studies assessing the environmental 
benefits of ISO 14001 have estimated its impact on the environmental performance of the 
adopters alone. These studies therefore do not capture the entire effects of ISO 14001 and may 
underestimate the total environmental benefits of EMS adoption and certification.  
In addition to ISO 14001, other variables also influence the probability of assessing 
suppliers’ environmental performance. For example, the facilities with quality management 
systems (OMPQMS) are 8.8 percent more likely to assess the environmental performance of their 
suppliers. Facilities facing input bans (INPTABAN) are also 8.6 percent more likely to assess the 
environmental performance of their suppliers. These results are consistent with the expectation 
that facility managers who face input bans will be wary of using noncompliant components in 
their products. For example, Sony had to recall 1.3 million exported game machines when Dutch 
authorities determined that cadmium levels in the peripheral cables, provided by suppliers, did 
not meet environmental standards.6 Since then, numerous manufactures, including Sony, have 
taken actions to prevent such incidents. 
                                                 
5 Anton et al. [1] showed that the more cpmrehensive environemntal practices lead to the reduction of environemtnal 
impacts.  
6 Sony CSR Report 2004.   12
The results also show that technologically innovative facility managers (AMTTECH2, 
AMTTECH3) are more likely to assess their suppliers’ environmental performance. These 
findings are consistent with evidence suggesting that R&D promotes more environmental 
practices (Anton et al. [1]), since GSCM can be considered one type of environmental practice.  
Other results, however, seem counterintuitive. For example, the coefficient of 
MRKETSOP3 is negative and significant. That is, the facilities exporting to global markets seem 
to be less likely to assess their suppliers’ environmental performance, an apparent contradiction 
with the actions taken by Sony and other exporters. However, many global markets do not have 
input ban policies. The facilities whose headquarters are located in foreign countries are less 
likely to assess their suppliers’ environmental performance (FRMINTL). Moreover, the 
coefficient of FRMQUOT is negative and statically significant, suggesting that facilities of 
publicly traded firms are less likely to assess the environmental performance of their suppliers. 
However, in each instance, all of these variables are positive and statistically significant 
coefficients in the ISO equation. Thus, the combined effects of these variables are much smaller 
than they appear in the ASSESS equation.  
In contrast to the ASSESS equation, most of the variables in the REQUIRE equation are 
statistically insignificant. The only exception is AMTTECH3, which suggests that technologically 
innovative facilities are more likely to require suppliers to undertake specific environmental 
measures.  
5.4. Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate the models with different 
specifications, samples, and estimation methods. First, we examine two different specifications 
with smaller sets of control variables: (1) Model 1, where neither the influence of groups or 
organizations nor the motivations for environmental practices are controlled for, and (2) Model 
2, where we do not control for the motivations for environmental practices. Model 3 includes all 
the control variables.  
The results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. In both models, the effects of 
ISO 14001 are found to be positive and significant. For example, in Model 2, the probability of 
assess (require) increases by 40.1 percent (50.6 percent) when the facility adopts ISO 14001. 
Actually, the sample we have used is part of the full sample; the full sample contains 
facilities that do not report their motivations for environmental practices. For this reason, we 
have more observations available for Models 1 and 2. The estimation results of Models 1 and 2 
using the full sample are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, respectively. Although the 
estimated effects become slightly smaller in most cases, our main results clearly do not change.    13
Our second robustness check involves examining whether our main findings are driven 
by the joint estimation. On the one hand, estimating equations (1)–(3) jointly is more efficient 
than that of each subsystem of two equations—that is, equations (1) and (3) and equations (2) 
and (3). On the other hand, the three-equation system is less robust than each two-equation 
system because if there is any misspecification in the assess equation, the misspecification bias 
will spill over to the require equation and vice versa. This motivates us to estimate two-equation 
systems: a bivariate probit of equations (1) and (3) and a bivariate probit of equations (2) and (3). 
For each bivariate probit model, we examine all combinations of the same control variables 
described in Models 1–3 for the full sample and the subsamples. The outcome is ten bivariate 
probit model estimations. As Table 4 indicates, our main results appear to be robust. Indeed, in 
most cases, the estimated effects are larger than the corresponding ones from the multivariate 
probit.  
As a third robustness check, we estimate the following linear probability models:  
1        , iA i A i i A ASSESS ISO X θ ε ′ =+ + δ  
1          , iR i R i i R REQUIRE ISO X θ ε ′ =+ + δ  
where we treat  i ISO  as an endogenous variable. That is, we estimate each equation by 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) to determine whether the normality assumption is a reason for our 
main results. As Table 4 shows, the 2SLS estimates of the effects are found to be larger in all 
cases. These findings suggest that our main results are not driven by the normality assumption. 
As discussed previously,  i ISO  is found to be exogenous in the require equation, and thus 
a univariate probit model can provide consistent estimates. The univariate results are presented in 
Appendix A. Although the estimated effects are smaller than those in the multivariate probit 
models, they are all positive and significant. The effect is estimated to be smallest when we use 
the subsample for Model 2. However, our results still suggest that the adoption of ISO 14001 
increases the probability that facilities require their suppliers to undertake specific environmental 
measures, by 37.7 percent. Overall, our main results appear to be quite robust to different 
specifications, samples, and estimation methods.  
5.5. Indirect Effects of Government Assistance Programs 
Using the estimates and the procedure detailed in Appendix B, we computed the effects 
of government assistance programs on ASSESS and REQUIRE. The results are shown in Table 5. 
The first two rows exhibit the results with the trivariate model, and the bottom two rows show 
the results with the bivariate probit models. Each column exhibits the results with different 
models and sample sizes. For example, column 5 presents the results of Model 3, which is our 
preferred model. The trivariate (bivariate) probit estimates indicate that an assistance program   14
increases the probability of assessing suppliers’ environmental performance by 9.2 percent (12.5 
percent), and assistance increases the probability of requiring suppliers to undertake specific 
environmental practices by 10.5 percent (14.8 percent).  
One may notice that the estimated indirect effects become slightly greater in Models 1 
and 2. This is because these models control for fewer variables: the assistance programs in 
Models 1 and 2 are likely to be correlated with variables excluded from Model 3, and thus the 
assistance program variable is capturing the effects of those excluded variables as well. The 
magnitudes of the impacts of the assistance program, however, are in the same range. The effects 
on ASSESS range from 9.2 percent to 16.5 percent and those on REQUIRE range from 11.9 
percent to 17.9 percent. In all the specifications with the two sample sizes, the effects are 
statistically significant. Thus, we conclude that government assistance programs are effective in 
promoting GSCM practices. If in fact GSCM practices improve the environmental performance 
of suppliers, our results also suggest that the effects of assistance programs on environmental 
performance should be larger than reported in Arimura et al. [2], who only examine the extent to 
which assistance programs help reduce the environmental impacts of ISO 14001 adopters.  
6. Conclusion 
Using Japanese facility-level data, we estimated the effects of ISO 14001 certification on 
the promotion of more advanced environmental practices, namely green supply chain 
management. We find that ISO 14001 promotes GSCM practices. Facilities with ISO 14001 are 
40 percent more likely to assess their suppliers’ environmental performance and 50 percent more 
likely to require that their suppliers undertake specific environmental practices.  
In the presence of the causal link between ISO 14001 and GSCM practices, we have 
argued that ISO 14001 may positively affect the environmental performance of suppliers by way 
of GSCM. This argument is valid if suppliers respond to buyers’ environmental performance 
assessments and requirements that they undertake specific environmental measures. However, 
there may be reasons why these suppliers’ environmental performance does not improve. For 
instance, a facility may choose a particular supplier specifically because this supplier already 
adheres to certain criteria for environmental management. If so, GSCM practices may induce no 
change in the supplier’s environmental behavior. However, if numerous facilities pursue GSCM, 
less environmentally conscious suppliers may feel pressure to modify their practices so that they 
are more environmentally friendly—or risk losing customers. In this regard, GSCM has the 
possibility of being a positive externality or spillover to ISO 14001 in the long run. 
Further, we find that a government policy of encouraging EMS adoption indirectly 
influences ISO 14001 adopters to implement GSCM practices. Specifically, government   15
assistance programs make it 9 percent more likely that ISO 14001 adopters will assess their 
suppliers’ environmental performance and 10 percent more likely that ISO 14001 adopters will 
require their suppliers to undertake specific environmental practices. This evidence supports the 
idea that encouraging firms to behave in an environmentally friendly way may be effective in 
addressing environmental problems.  
Though our study is the first attempt to shed light on the spillover effects of facilities’ 
voluntary actions, data limitations make it impossible for us to examine the effects of ISO 14001 
on the environmental performance of adopters’ suppliers. Therefore, one fruitful avenue for 
future research is to examine the environmental performance of facilities operating within the 
supply chain to determine whether buyers’ GSCM practices lead to measurable improvements 
among their suppliers. We hope that demonstrating the relationship between ISO 14001 and 
GSCM stimulates other scholars to consider whether these relationships exist among other 
international settings and whether ISO 14001 might encourage other types of advanced 
environmental practices as well.   16
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
ASSESS  945 0.407 0.492 0 1
REQUIRE  945 0.392 0.488 0 1
ISO  945 0.419 0.494 0 1
OMPQMS  945 0.742 0.438 0 1
LNFACAGE  945 3.563 0.633 0.693  5.656
LNFACEMPL  945 4.933 0.994 1.792  10.26
FRMFACS  945 2.724 7.304 0 131
FRMQUOT  945 0.114 0.318 0 1
FRMINTL  945 0.016 0.125 0 1
CUSTEND  945 0.324 0.468 0 1
CUSTMIDDLE  945 0.636 0.481 0 1
MRKTSCOP1  945 0.683 0.466 0 1
MRKTSCOP2  945 0.010 0.097 0 1
MRKTSCOP3  945 0.183 0.387 0 1
MRKTCONC1  945 0.288 0.453 0 1
MRKTCONC2  945 0.345 0.476 0 1
INPTBAN  945 0.206 0.405 0 1
TECHSTD  945 0.222 0.416 0 1
PERFSTD  945 0.620 0.486 0 1
INPTAX  945 0.534 0.499 0 1
LIAB  945 0.565 0.496 0 1
INFODMD  945 0.418 0.493 0 1
INFOSPPL  945 0.544 0.498 0 1
VOLAGR  945 0.383 0.486 0 1
SUBSIDY  945 0.384 0.487 0 1
TECHASS  945 0.273 0.446 0 1
INFLCORP  945 0.471 0.499 0 1
INFLCONS  945 0.450 0.498 0 1
INFLINV  945 0.225 0.418 0 1
INFLBANK  945 0.219 0.414 0 1
INFLMGMT  945 0.621 0.485 0 1
INFLWORK  945 0.605 0.489 0 1
INFLUNIO  945 0.214 0.410 0 1
INFLIND  945 0.262 0.440 0 1
INFLENGO  945 0.292 0.455 0 1
INFLCOMM  945 0.669 0.471 0 1
AMTPREV2  877 0.446 0.497 0 1
AMTPREV3  877 0.526 0.500 0 1
AMTRGC2  899 0.443 0.497 0 1
AMTRGC3  899 0.533 0.499 0 1
AMTIMG2  893 0.545 0.498 0 1
AMTIMG3  893 0.418 0.493 0 1
AMTSAV2  883 0.553 0.498 0 1
AMTSAV3  883 0.399 0.490 0 1
AMTTECH2  825 0.571 0.495 0 1
AMTTECH3  825 0.298 0.458 0 1  20
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
   ISO 14001 Adopter (ISO = 1) ISO 14001 Nonadopter (ISO = 0) Mean 
Variable  Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Difference
ASSESS  396 0.538  0.499 549 0.313 0.464 22.5% 
REQUIRE  396 0.664  0.473 549 0.195 0.396 46.9%    
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Table 3: Estimation Results 
  ASSESS REQUIRE  ISO 
Variable  (1) Coefficient  (2) APE  (3) Coefficient  (4) APE  (5) Coefficient  (6) APE 
ISO   1.218 (0.326)***   0.407 (0.098)***   1.460 (0.373)***   0.492 (0.113)***     
OMPQMS   0.280 (0.134)**   0.088 (0.042)**   0.099 (0.137)   0.028 (0.039)   0.522 (0.177)***   0.107 (0.037)*** 
LNFACAGE   0.014 (0.084)   0.004 (0.026)  -0.128 (0.093)  -0.036 (0.026)  -0.315 (0.099)***  -0.063 (0.020)*** 
LNFACEMPL  -0.075 (0.070)  -0.024 (0.022)   0.044 (0.078)   0.012 (0.022)   0.507 (0.080)***   0.101 (0.015)*** 
FRMFACS  -0.003 (0.006)  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.003 (0.007)  -0.001 (0.002)   0.020 (0.013)   0.004 (0.003) 
FRMQUOT  -0.396 (0.176)**  -0.119 (0.049)**  -0.140 (0.182)  -0.039 (0.049)   0.580 (0.215)***   0.120 (0.047)*** 
FRMINTL  -1.043 (0.388)***  -0.275 (0.075)***   0.558 (0.437)   0.162 (0.128)   0.753 (0.589)   0.151 (0.115) 
CUSTEND   0.027 (0.255)   0.039 (0.044)   0.051 (0.266)   0.046 (0.041)  -0.567 (0.332)*  -0.038 (0.038) 
CUSTMIDDLE  -0.150  (0.239) -0.050  (0.056) -0.170  (0.250) -0.052  (0.052) -0.549  (0.301)*  -0.081  (0.045)* 
MRKTSCOP1  -0.470 (0.145)***  -0.105 (0.038)***  -0.083 (0.176)  -0.004 (0.040)   0.432 (0.210)**   0.043 (0.034) 
MRKTSCOP2  -0.592 (0.434)  -0.044 (0.124)  -0.555 (0.502)  -0.115 (0.119)   0.789 (0.556)   0.063 (0.112) 
MRKTSCOP3  -0.658 (0.192)***  -0.102 (0.041)**  -0.309 (0.225)  -0.067 (0.039)*   1.006 (0.244)***   0.151 (0.036)*** 
MRKTCONC1   0.002 (0.122)   0.004 (0.034)  -0.022 (0.130)  -0.003 (0.032)   0.239 (0.161)   0.024 (0.028) 
MRKTCONC2  -0.031 (0.117)  -0.010 (0.032)  -0.035 (0.121)  -0.008 (0.030)   0.319 (0.142)**   0.050 (0.025)** 
INPTBAN   0.268 (0.116)**  0.086 (0.038)** 0.189 (0.129) 0.054 (0.038) 0.089 (0.153) 0.018 (0.031)
TECHSTD  -0.038 (0.121)  -0.012 (0.038)  -0.087 (0.136)  -0.024 (0.038)   0.157 (0.158)   0.032 (0.032) 
PERFSTD   0.038 (0.137)   0.012 (0.043)  -0.018 (0.143)  -0.005 (0.040)   0.498 (0.156)***   0.103 (0.034)*** 
INPTAX  -0.036  (0.134) -0.011  (0.042) -0.152  (0.140) -0.043  (0.040) -0.834  (0.163)***  -0.157  (0.029)*** 
LIAB   0.052 (0.126)   0.016 (0.040)   0.083 (0.133)   0.023 (0.038)  -0.045 (0.158)  -0.009 (0.031) 
INFODMD   0.020 (0.115)   0.006 (0.036)   0.136 (0.119)   0.039 (0.034)  -0.152 (0.146)  -0.030 (0.029) 
INFOSPPL  -0.209 (0.128)  -0.065 (0.039)  -0.033 (0.148)  -0.009 (0.041)   0.581 (0.150)***   0.122 (0.032)*** 
VOLAGR  -0.012 (0.122)  -0.004 (0.038)  -0.046 (0.131)  -0.013 (0.037)   0.231 (0.158)   0.047 (0.032) 
SUBSIDY  -0.148 (0.134)  -0.046 (0.042)   0.011 (0.141)   0.003 (0.040)  -0.114 (0.172)  -0.023 (0.034) 
TECHASS   0.166 (0.139)   0.053 (0.044)   0.107 (0.147)   0.030 (0.042)  -0.316 (0.181)*  -0.062 (0.035)* 
INFLCORP   0.157 (0.107)   0.050 (0.034)   0.099 (0.113)   0.028 (0.033)   0.158 (0.129)   0.032 (0.026) 
INFLCONS   0.177 (0.109)   0.056 (0.035)   0.034 (0.115)   0.009 (0.032)  -0.240 (0.137)*  -0.047 (0.027)* 
INFLINV  -0.035 (0.146)  -0.011 (0.045) 0.142 (0.158) 0.041 (0.046) -0.040 (0.173) -0.008 (0.034)
INFLBANK   0.110 (0.140)   0.035 (0.045)  -0.038 (0.150)  -0.011 (0.042)   0.098 (0.168)   0.020 (0.034) 
INFLMGMT  -0.014 (0.173)  -0.004 (0.054)  -0.270 (0.186)  -0.074 (0.049)   0.025 (0.217)   0.005 (0.043) 
INFLWORK  -0.041 (0.194)  -0.013 (0.060)   0.262 (0.250)   0.075 (0.062)   1.005 (0.220)***   0.216 (0.049)***    
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INFLUNIO   0.050 (0.130)   0.016 (0.041)   0.066 (0.142)   0.019 (0.040)  -0.239 (0.170)  -0.047 (0.032) 
INFLIND   0.053 (0.136)  0.017 (0.043) 0.083 (0.140) 0.024 (0.040) 0.080 (0.165) 0.016 (0.033)
INFLENGO  -0.070 (0.122)  -0.022 (0.038) -0.054 (0.124) -0.015 (0.035) 0.060 (0.159) 0.012 (0.032)
INFLCOMM   0.089 (0.125)   0.028 (0.039)   0.021 (0.131)   0.006 (0.037)  -0.277 (0.153)*  -0.054 (0.029)* 
AMTIMG2  -0.172 (0.258)  -0.049 (0.051)  -0.459 (0.294)  -0.069 (0.052)   0.395 (0.290)   0.016 (0.034) 
AMTIMG3  -0.041 (0.276)   0.016 (0.051)  -0.510 (0.308)*  -0.075 (0.046)   0.692 (0.307)**   0.099 (0.038)*** 
AMTSAV2  -0.099 (0.242)  -0.004 (0.050)  -0.299 (0.253)  -0.050 (0.047)   0.061 (0.297)  -0.006 (0.037) 
AMTSAV3  -0.215 (0.258)  -0.050 (0.047)  -0.309 (0.269)  -0.041 (0.044)   0.207 (0.319)   0.035 (0.039) 
AMTTECH2   0.392 (0.147)***   0.052 (0.034)   0.288 (0.166)*   0.023 (0.034)  -0.313 (0.196)  -0.036 (0.030) 
AMTTECH3   0.706 (0.173)***   0.152 (0.040)***   0.663 (0.196)***   0.143 (0.039)***  -0.423 (0.227)*  -0.049 (0.032) 
PRGEMP         0.983  (0.151)***    0.210  (0.029)*** 
 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the assess, require, and ISO 14001 equations (i.e., equations 1, 2, and 3, respectively) which are jointly 
estimated by the maximum simulated likelihood. The number of observations is 811. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** 
indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. APE denotes average partial effect. Industry dummies as well as the constant are 
included in the model, though their coefficients are not reported here. The log pseudo-likelihood of the model is -1151.96.  (,) , AR CORR ε ε  (, ) , AI S O CORR εε  
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Table 4: Robustness Check 
 
(1) Model 1  
(N = 945) 
(2) Model 2  
(N = 945) 
(3) Model 1  
(N = 811) 
(4) Model 2  
(N = 811) 
(5) Model 3  
(N = 811) 
Trivariate Probit       
ASSESS   0.499 (0.059)***  0.415 (0.079)***  0.504 (0.055)***  0.401 (0.091)***  0.407 (0.098)*** 
REQUIRE   0.554 (0.085)***  0.464 (0.123)***  0.598 (0.064)***  0.506 (0.108)***  0.492 (0.113)*** 
Bivariate Probit       
ASSESS   0.479 (0.065)***  0.383 (0.085)***  0.503 (0.056)***  0.406 (0.082)***  0.410 (0.086)*** 
REQUIRE   0.567 (0.098)***  0.482 (0.121)***  0.608 (0.089)***  0.521 (0.110)***  0.523 (0.126)*** 
2SLS       
ASSESS   0.730 (0.221)***  0.705 (0.259)***  0.728 (0.201)***  0.700 (0.228)***  0.743 (0.244)*** 
REQUIRE   0.825 (0.210)***  0.811 (0.245)***  0.786 (0.189)***  0.772 (0.214)***  0.837 (0.228)*** 
 
Note: This table reports the average partial effects (APEs) of ISO 14001 on (1) the probability that the facility assesses the environmental performance of its 
suppliers and (2) the probability that the facility requires its suppliers to undertake environmental measures. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummies as well as the constant are included into all models. For the 
variables included in Models 1–3, see the table in Appendix A.  
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Table 5: Indirect Effects of Government Assistance on GSCM 
  (1) Model 1 
(N = 945) 
(2) Model 2 
(N = 945) 
(3) Model 1 
(N = 811) 
(4) Model 2 
(N = 811) 
(5) Model 3 
(N = 811) 
Trivariate Probit       
ASSESS   0.155 (0.058)***  0.129 (0.049)***  0.165 (0.062)***  0.124 (0.052)**  0.092 (0.049)* 
REQUIRE  0.153 (0.058)***  0.136 (0.055)**  0.170 (0.063)***  0.148 (0.058)**  0.104 (0.052)** 
Bivariate Probit       
ASSESS   0.153 (0.059)***  0.119 (0.048)**  0.179 (0.072)**  0.128 (0.052)**  0.125 (0.053)** 
REQUIRE  0.161 (0.064)**  0.142 (0.058)**  0.184 (0.076)**  0.155 (0.063)**  0.148 (0.049)*** 
 
Note: This table reports the average partial effects (APEs) of government assistance (PRGEMP) on (1) the probability that the facility assesses its suppliers, 
Pr(ASSESS = 1) and (2) the probability that the facility requires its suppliers to undertake environmental measures, Pr(REQUIRE = 1). Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. For the variables included in Models 1–3, see the table in Appendix A.  
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Appendix A: Univariate Probit Results for the Require Equation 
  (1) Model 1  (2) Model 2  (3) Model 1  (4) Model 2  (5) Model 3 
Variable   APE   APE   APE   APE   APE 
ISO   0.411 (0.042)***   0.380 (0.044)***   0.404 (0.044)***   0.377 (0.046)***   0.389 (0.045)*** 
OMPQMS   0.034 (0.037)   0.034 (0.037)   0.046 (0.041)   0.046 (0.041)   0.047 (0.040) 
LNFACAGE  -0.032 (0.024)  -0.025 (0.024)  -0.049 (0.026)  -0.040 (0.026)  -0.041 (0.027) 
LNFACEMPL   0.024 (0.018)   0.025 (0.018)   0.024 (0.019)   0.024 (0.019)   0.024 (0.018) 
FRMFACS  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002)   0.000 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002) 
FRMQUOT  -0.018 (0.050)  -0.037 (0.050)  -0.016 (0.053)  -0.042 (0.053)  -0.041 (0.052) 
FRMINTL   0.179 (0.134)   0.158 (0.131)   0.183 (0.135)   0.156 (0.134)   0.175 (0.131) 
CUSTEND  -0.046 (0.066)  -0.043 (0.066)   0.016 (0.071)   0.023 (0.073)   0.012 (0.074) 
CUSTMIDDLE  -0.065 (0.061)  -0.061 (0.061)  -0.045 (0.064)  -0.041 (0.066)  -0.055 (0.067) 
MRKTSCOP1  -0.006 (0.044)   0.000 (0.043)  -0.014 (0.050)  -0.014 (0.049)  -0.025 (0.049) 
MRKTSCOP2  -0.122 (0.134)  -0.124 (0.132) -0.130 (0.141)  -0.142 (0.139) -0.141 (0.134)
MRKTSCOP3  -0.024 (0.055)  -0.024 (0.053)  -0.044 (0.061)  -0.049 (0.059)  -0.075 (0.059) 
MRKTCONC1  -0.016 (0.036)  -0.007 (0.035)  -0.011 (0.039)  -0.002 (0.039)   0.001 (0.039) 
MRKTCONC2  -0.006 (0.033)   0.000 (0.033)  -0.008 (0.036)  -0.001 (0.036)   0.000 (0.036) 
INPTBAN   0.073 (0.039)*   0.071 (0.038)*   0.066 (0.040)*   0.066 (0.040)*   0.064 (0.039) 
TECHSTD  -0.024 (0.037)  -0.027 (0.037)  -0.025 (0.039)  -0.028 (0.039)  -0.024 (0.039) 
PERFSTD  -0.003 (0.037)  -0.007 (0.037)  -0.002 (0.041)  -0.005 (0.041)   0.006 (0.041) 
INPTAX  -0.063 (0.035)  -0.070 (0.035)  -0.060 (0.038)  -0.066 (0.038)  -0.060 (0.038) 
LIAB   0.016 (0.037)   0.011 (0.037)   0.022 (0.041)   0.020 (0.041)   0.022 (0.040) 
INFODMD   0.062 (0.035)*   0.050 (0.035)   0.050 (0.036)   0.041 (0.037)   0.038 (0.037) 
INFOSPPL   0.005 (0.037)   0.004 (0.038)   0.003 (0.041)   0.003 (0.042)   0.003 (0.041) 
VOLAGR   0.011 (0.037)   0.000 (0.037)   0.012 (0.039)  -0.004 (0.039)  -0.010 (0.039) 
SUBSIDY   0.002 (0.040)  0.004 (0.040) 0.001 (0.042)  0.004 (0.042) 0.006 (0.043)
TECHASS   0.048 (0.042)   0.039 (0.041)   0.050 (0.044)   0.042 (0.043)   0.018 (0.043) 
INFLCORP     0.024 (0.032)     0.044 (0.035)   0.037 (0.034) 
INFLCONS     0.028 (0.032)     0.014 (0.035)   0.004 (0.034) 
INFLINV     0.026 (0.045)     0.034 (0.048)   0.043 (0.047) 
INFLBANK     0.019 (0.042)     0.002 (0.045)  -0.008 (0.044)    
26 
INFLMGMT    -0.060 (0.047)    -0.068 (0.053)  -0.077 (0.053) 
INFLWORK    0.115 (0.053)** 0.099 (0.057)* 0.101 (0.057)*
INFLUNIO    -0.001 (0.039) 0.010 (0.042) 0.011 (0.041)
INFLIND     0.022 (0.041)     0.039 (0.044)   0.033 (0.043) 
INFLENGO    -0.004 (0.036)    -0.019 (0.037)  -0.017 (0.037) 
INFLCOMM    -0.025 (0.035)    -0.003 (0.039)   0.000 (0.039) 
AMTIMG2      -0.124  (0.084) 
AMTIMG3      -0.131  (0.087) 
AMTSAV2      -0.081  (0.076) 
AMTSAV3      -0.079  (0.081) 
AMTTECH2        0.073  (0.049) 
AMTTECH3        0.184  (0.060)*** 
Pseudo R-squared   0.209  0.217 0.202 0.210 0.224
Log  likelihood  -500.63 -495.26 -439.51 -435.03 -427.38 
Nobs    945   945   811   811   811 
 
Note: This table presents the average partial effects (APEs) of explanatory variables on the probability that the facility requires its suppliers to undertake 
environmental measures. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Industry dummies as well as the constant are included in all models, though their coefficients are not reported here.  Resources for the Future  Arimura, Darnall, and Katayama 
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Appendix B: Indirect Effects of Assistance Program 
 
We compute the indirect effect of assistance program (PRGEMP) on the probability that ASSESS 
= 1, i.e.,  
P r (1 | 1 , ) P r (1 | 0 , ) ASSESS PRGEMP X ASSESS PRGEMP X == − == , 
where  X  is a vector of exogenous variables other than PRGEMP. Note that  
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Each term on the right-hand side can be computed by the GHK simulator; similarly for  
Pr( 1| 0, )
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ASSESS PRGEMP X ASSESS PRGEMP X
N =
== − == ∑ . 
In an analogous manner, we compute the indirect effect of assistance program (PRGEMP) on the 
probability that REQUIRE = 1. 
 
 